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G R O U N D S  AND LIMITS 
OF S C H O P E N H A U E R ’ S  PESSIMISM 
I 
C H O P E N H A U E R  compared his philosophy to  Thebes S with its hundred gates. Kuno Fischer sees only four 
gates: Kant, Plato, the Vedas, Buddha. T h e  main door 
is the Kantian; it is as the one and true heir t o  Kant’s 
crown that Schopenhauer ever proclaims himself, in oppo- 
sition to  the other post-Kantians. T o  Rosenkranz he 
writes: “I have taken only one step beyond Kant, but not 
up in the air, as all the acrobats of my time, but on firm 
and solid ground.” Hi s  own chief claim as a technical 
philosopher was that he had solved Kant’s problem of the 
thing-in-itself. 
Schopenhauer’s theory of knowledge accentuates Kant’s 
phenomenalism. T h e  world of our knowledge is a world 
in which the mind is a t  home, a world organized by the 
mind. N o  object without a subject; no subject without an 
object; the world is my idea. T h e  naive realist imagines 
that he sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches real, entirely 
extra-mental things, that he knows a world which exists 
as he knows it independently of his knowing it. Kant, 
admitting that things-in-themselves are, declares that we can 
never know what they are. All that we can know is in 
terms of space, time, causality. 
This idealistic philosophy is in diametrical opposition to  
all substantialist metaphysics, materialistic or spiritualistic. 
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“Soul-substance”, t o  Kant, is hollow sound without mean- 
ing; and we can rightly regard Kant also as the true and 
final destroyer of materialistic dogmatism. Materialism, 
Schopenhauer says, is a persistent attempt to  set up a sys- 
tem of physics without metaphysics, to  make the phenome- 
non the thing-in-itself. But “nothing can be more clumsy 
than that, after the manner of all materialists, one should 
blindly take the objective as simply given in order t o  de- 
rive everything from it without paying any regard to  the 
subjective, through which, however, nay, in which alone 
the former exists.” M a n  is the metaphysical animal. 
Physics is not metaphysics any more than indefinitely ex- 
tended breadth is depth. “Those persons who believe that 
crucibles and retorts are the true and only source of all 
wisdom are in their own way just as perverse as were for- 
merly their antipodes the Scholastics.” T o  be sure those 
who peel the husks of nature may imagine they are dissect- 
ing its kernel; all’ of them ostensibly suitors of Penelope, 
they yet sleep contentedly in the house of Odysseus, each 
by the side of his chosen maid-servant, banishing all thought 
of the sovereign mistress. 
This express repudiation of materialism and its vota- 
ries should be kept in mind; it is in agreement with Schopen- 
hauer’s theory of experience and with his Kantian inheri- 
tance. Notwithstanding a misleading materialistic bias 
which is manifest in Schopenhauer’s metaphysical account 
of the intellect, it is clear that with historical material- 
ism, and especially with the materialism of his own time, 
Schopenhauer would have no part  and lot. T h e  references 
to  Buchner in his correspondence should leave little doubt 
as t o  his own attitude towards materialism, which he re- 
peatedly called a philosophy for barbers’ and apothecaries’ 
apprentices. When he quotes Cabanis, when he treats 
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intellect as a mere cerebral phenomenon, he is not to  be con- 
fused with materialism, any more than when he calls the 
brain parasitic, a pensioner of the body and its highest 
efflorescence. T h e  difference between Schopenhauer and 
materialism is radical : the latter would derive thought 
from matter, the immediately given from the mediately 
given, all the while forgetting that the matter of which it 
discourses is always necessarily object of a subject. But 
when Schopenhauer treats thought as a phenomenon of the 
brain, thought and brain, mind and body (themselves al- 
ways correlative) must both be to  him instruments and 
objectifications of the  reality, which is the ultimate ground 
of them both and which transcends both subject and object. 
W e  have now reached the point from which Schopen- 
hauer would step beyond Kant. T h e  thing-in-itself is neither 
matter nor mind, it is will. T h e  world in its ultimate reality 
is not a system of intelligence nor a mechanical order of 
things; its inmost nature is best described by the analogy 
of our craving, driving, seeking character. Just as Hegel, 
conceiving of reality as the progressive self-organization 
of differences, and finding in the thought-process the most 
adequate and characteristic expression of this essential na- 
ture of all reality, chose “Thought” as his magic word, so 
Schopenhauer’s radically different metaphysics leads him to  
call the ultimate reality “Will”. T h a t  which sends the fall- 
ing stone to the earth, the iron filings to  the magnet, the 
sunflower towards the sun, the moth to  the lighted candle 
is the same, and the same as that which sends the lover t o  
the arms of his beloved. But this is nowise equivalent 
to  “the insane opinion that the stone moves itself in ac- 
cordance with a known motive, merely because this is the 
way in which will appears in man”. 
Will is that which is most immediate in consciousness, 
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and prior t o  the subject-object dualism; and like a magic 
spell, it unlocks to  us the inmost being of all nature. I t  
germinates in the plant;  through it the crystal is formed 
and the magnetic needle turns to  the Nor th ;  it is manifest 
in chemical affinities, in repulsion and attraction, decompo- 
sition and combination, cohesion, gravitation. All these are  
different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their 
inner nature are  identical. Organic or  inorganic, conscious 
or unconscious, as  the case may be, the will ever presses 
for  its fulfilment, meeting impact with resistance, adapting 
means to  end, responding to  stimuli, seeking the gratifica- 
tion of instincts, acting on motives, on purpose, loving, hat- 
ing, hoping, fearing, scorning, envying, enthusing, aspiring. 
H e r e  is a teleology prior t o  and more ultimate than intelli- 
gence. “The bird builds the nest for  the young which it 
does not yet know; the beaver constructs a dam the object 
of which is unknown to i t ;  ants, marmots, and bees lay in 
provision for the winter they have never experienced; the 
spider and the ant-lion make snares, as if with deliberate 
cunning, for  future unknown prey; insects deposit their 
eggs where the coming brood finds future nourishment. . . . 
T h e  larva of the male stag-beetle . . . makes the hole in 
the wood for  its metamorphosis as big again as the female 
does, in order to  have room for  its future horns.” 
Gills, claws, teeth, fins, wings, are all instruments of the 
will: the water pouch in the stomach of the camel, the sail 
of the nautilus, the eagle’s far-seeing eye, the dog’s keen 
nose. And likewise an instrument of the will is man’s think- 
ing power. Phenomenally, in terms of the subject-object 
dualism, the mind is the not-body; ultimately body and mind 
are objectifications and tools of the will-reality, elaborate 
means to  attain its ends. Wha t  the snake does with its 
venom, the bird or the insect with its color mimicry, that  
Schopenhauer’s Pessimism 273 
man accomplishes with his deliberately thought-out method 
of attack and defense. 
I1 
Ubiquitous and ever-active is the will-and it ever fails 
of final attainment. Eternal becoming and endless flux 
characterize its inmost nature; every attainment is only the 
beginning of a new pursuit. And right here is the seed 
sown of Schopenhauer’s pessimism. For in man will is 
manifest as desire, and desire essentially insatiate. Will is 
want: its basis is need, deficiency: we want what we want, 
what we lack, and this consciousness of our lack is the kernel 
of suffering. “Pain,” Schopenhauer wrote in 1817, “arises 
not from not-having, but from the desire to  have, and yet 
not having.” This  desire for  what we lack, unsatisfied, is 
pain ; the desire satisfied is pleasure, which quickly passes 
into another painful state of further desire, or else into 
a more general sense of desires gratified, which is tedium. 
W e  can clearly see, then, that  from Schopenhauer’s point 
of view pleasure is the exception, pain the rule in human 
life. Pain is the fundamental, positive, and primary; pleas- 
ure is negative and secondary, the temporary alleviation of 
pain. “I know accordingly no greater absurdity than that 
of most metaphysical systems which explain evil as some- 
thing negative, while it is exactly the positive which is mak- 
ing itself felt.” Ribot observes that here also Schopen- 
hauer has learned from Kant, except that  what Kant men- 
tions only in passing his disciple has developed into an 
important doctrine. Will is effort, is desire, is painful. 
“The  desire lasts long, the demands are infinite ; the satisfac- 
tion is short and scantily measured out”;  it  is like the crust 
thrown to the beggar, that he may be hungry to-morrow 
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also. I n  the plants there is no sensibility, and no pain, 
but from the lowest animal life clear up the scale, as con- 
sciousness ascends, pain also increases : “ H e  that increaseth 
knowledge increaseth sorrow.” No t  only is pleasure second- 
ary and negative, impermanent: it is only a brief transi- 
tion. Either the will reasserts itself in a new desire and 
a new pain, or life lapses into the dull sense of desires grati- 
fied, for desires that have been gratified are dust to  him 
who can think of nothing further t o  spur him on. Life 
presents a more o r  less violent oscillation between pain and 
boredom. While the poor are ever battling with need, 
with pain, the rich are desperately a t  war with ennui. T h e  
illusory hope of real satisfaction sends rich and poor on 
the road, and the tramp meets the tourist. But on the road 
of craving desire no final satisfaction and no peace is to  
be found. “ I t  is essentially all the same whether we pursue 
or flee, fear injury o r  seek enjoyment; the care for the con- 
stant demands of the will, in whatever form it may be, 
continually occupies and sways the consciousness ; but with- 
out peace no true well-being is possible. T h e  subject of 
willing is thus constantly stretched on the revolving wheel 
of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the Danaids, is the 
ever-longing Tantalus.” 
Even if the pleasures of life were real and permanent, 
even i f  life yielded a balance of pleasure over pain, still life 
would fall short of justification, for the evil remains: my 
present well-being cannot undo my past suffering or the 
present and past suffering of others. As Petrarch says: 
A thousand joys won’t solace for one torment. 
One beggar, one sick man, one corpse were enough for 
Gautama. But worse still: pleasure is mere froth and 
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vapor, like the wine provided by Mephistopheles in Auer- 
bach’s cellar, “after every sensuous pleasure we also say: 
And yet  methought I were drinking wine.” 
Life is a lie, and it is a wicked lie. M a n  is a creature of 
desire, and thus normally selfish. Egoism is limitless; 
man is bent on attaining the utmost of pleasure; whatever 
is in his way rouses his hate and his ruthless opposition. 
Were  each person to  choose between his own destruction 
and that of all other men, who can doubt what the decision 
would be in most cases? Each man regards himself the 
center of the world: ‘‘no sharper contrast can be imagined 
than that between the profound and exclusive attention 
which every person devotes to  his own self, and the indiffer- 
ence with which, as a rule, all other people regard that 
self,-an indifference precisely like that with which he in 
turn looks upon them.” 
PoIiteness is but a screen which men have adopted for 
hiding the shameful sight of their real motives. But the 
least pressure pushes the screen aside and reveals our naked 
selfishness. Well  might we pray, “lead us not into tempta- 
tion: let us not see what manner of persons we are”. A 
code of politeness is not enough; a corps of policemen is 
required to  keep the peace. “The  thousands that throng 
before our eyes, in peaceful intercourse each with the other, 
can only be regarded as so many tigers and wolves, whose 
teeth are secured by a strong muzzle.” H o m o  homini 
With  Hobbes, Schopenhauer describes life as a war of 
each against all. Strife only reveals that variance with 
itself which is essential t o  the will. “The  will to  live every. 
where preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own 
nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues 
lupus. 
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all the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use.” 
Crystals in process of formation meet, cross, and disarrange 
each other. T h e  young hydra, while still joined onto the 
old, fights with it for food. Cut the Australian bull-dog 
ant in two-head and tail rush into battle. In  Java Yung- 
hahn saw a plain as f a r  as the eye could reach all covered 
with skeletons of large turtles, five feet long. On coming 
out of the sea to  lay their eggs they are attacked by wild 
dogs, which, with their united strength, turn over the tur- 
tles, strip off the small shell of their stomachs, and devour 
them alive. But often then a tiger pounces upon the dogs. 
From this field of bones, turn to  hundreds of other fields 
where some arch-fiend in the form of a conqueror has put 
hundreds of thousands of men opposite each other and 
said to  th‘em: “Shoot each other with guns and cannon!” 
And they have done so. History is the recital of wars, the 
peaceful years are but pauses between the cat-fights. 
Normal and universal is selfishness, but the wickedness, 
the suffering may reach staggering extremes. T h e  egoist 
seeks his own advantage and is ever ready t o  strike down all 
who oppose him; but cruel spitefulness leads men to  strike 
down others for the pure joy of seeing others suffer. Ca- 
ligula wished the whole world had but one single neck, so 
that he could sever it all a t  one blow. From these two 
sources spring the vices of men, the bestial vices of egoism: 
greed, gluttony, lust, selfishness, avarice, covetousness, in- 
justice, hardness of heart, pride, arrogance, etc; the devil- 
ish vices of spitefulness : disaffection. envy, ill-will, malice, 
pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity, slander, 
insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, fraud, thirst 
for revenge, cruelty. “ I t  is an array”, Schopenhauer 
comments, “reminding one of the Princes of Darkness in 
Milton’s Pandemonium.” Life’s everyday sordidness and 
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misery may not impress the callous spectator, “but one only 
needs to  bring before his eyes the horrible suffering and 
misery on which even his own life is so clearly established, 
and the horror of it must certainly grip him: then indeed 
lead him through the infirmaries, military hospitals, and 
surgical chambers of torture, on through the prisons, 
through the Leads of Venice, the slave markets of Algiers, 
the torture chambers of the Inquisition, over the battlefields 
and through the judgment halls, unlock for him all the dark 
dwellings of misery where it creeps away from the gaze 
of cold curiosity, and finally from Dante read to  him 
the death of Ugolino and his children from starvation in the 
tower and point out that  this has really happened more 
than once,” and then this world will disclose itself t o  him 
for what it really is-the scene of tormented and agonized 
beings who exist by devouring each other, each ravenous 
beast the living grave of others. Where did Dante learn 
about his Inferno? Optimism, theodicies, and all prattle 
about this best of all possible worlds are  idle, and they are 
wicked, cruel sneers a t  the endless and unspeakable miseries 
of man. 
This  is human life: a hospital for incurables. If there 
be any purpose in life, it seems to  be suffering. “Work, 
torture, trouble, and need is certainly the lifelong lot  of 
almost all men.” Men are like lambs gamboling in the 
meadow the while the butcher picks them over one by one. 
Life is as wretched as it is vile. H e r e  is the blind mole, 
unweariedly digging with its shovel claws, from birth to  
death:  t o  what purpose? T o  eat enough to  engender an- 
other blind digger. And here is a cotton-spinner: a child 
of five he entered the factory and there has spent his life, 
performing the same mechanical labor, ten, twelve, four- 
teen hours a day, year in, year out: to what end is the 
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satisfaction of drawing breath thus dearly purchased? Life 
is a wretched jest, as Voltaire called it, and wisdom, ancient 
and modern, has agreed with him. From Homer  and 
Sophocles and Euripides to  Shakespeare and Byron and 
Leopardi, we hear the same sad refrain, and the old words 
of the Sage Bias still hold true: “Most men are bad.” I n  
all Homer  Schopenhauer does not find one truly magnani- 
mous character, although many are good and honest; and 
“in the whole of Shakespeare there may be perhaps a couple 
of noble, though by no means transcendently noble, charac- 
ters t o  be found.” “Abject selfishness, boundless avarice, 
well-concealed knavery, and also poisonous envy and fiend- 
ish delight in the misfortunes of others” are so universally 
prevalent that the slightest exception surprises us. But the 
optimist bids us: open your eyes and look a t  the world, how 
beautiful it  is in the sunshine, with its mountains and valleys, 
streams, plants, animals, and so forth. “Is this world, then, 
a raree show?” Schopenhauer exclaims. “The  world is 
glorious t o  look at, but dreadful in reality.” Instead of 
inventing a hell in after-life, look about you: all the mate- 
rials for hell are close a t  hand. 
Past, present, and future are all one, progress is vain 
tedium. Life, essentially tragic, is in its details a sorry 
monotonous comedy : as in the dramas of Gozzi, the motives 
and incidents in each play are different, but the spirit is 
ever the same, and ever the same are the characters. “Pan- 
taloon has become no more agile or generous, Tartaglia 
no more conscientious, Brighella no  more courageous, and 
Columbine no more modest.’’ Life does not have evils, it i s  
evil; as Calderon says : 
T h e  greatest of man’s sins 
Is that he was ever born. 
Sc hopen hauer’s Pessimism 279 
Life is a bankrupt, a business that does not pay expenses; 
the will is an effort which frustrates itself. T h e  less of life, 
the better; its brevity is its only virtue. This is the wisdom 
of Hamlet’s soliloquy: “Our state is so wretched that ab- 
solute annihilation would be decidedly preferable”. This, 
too, is Othello’s judgment of life in his words to  Iago:  
I’ld have thee live; 
For,  in my sense, ’tis happiness to die. 
So also Palmira to  Mohammed in Voltaire’s tragedy : 
T h e  world is made for tyrants; live and reign! 
From all this torture is there no relief? Out of this dark 
cavern of illusion shines there no beacon light of enlighten- 
ment? From the craving weariness and the thirsty evil of 
life is there really no peace? W e  have heard the pessi- 
mistic verdict on life, wholesale and in detail : what is Scho- 
penhauer’s gospel of salvation ? 
I11 
Like Ulysses who in all his many trials never wept, but 
burst into tears on hearing his early heroic exploits sung in 
the palace of the Phzacian king; or like that English client 
in court who wept as his case was set forth by his counsel 
and declared: “I never knew I had suffered half so much 
till I heard it here to-day”, so the reader is apt to turn away 
from Schopenhauer’s portrayal of life with Hamlet’s words 
on his lips: 
0 that this too too solid flesh would melt, 
T h a w  and resolve itself into a dew1 
O r  that the Everlasting had not fixt 
His cannon ’gainst self-slaughter! 0 God! God! 
How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable 
Seem to me all the uses of this world! 
Fie on’tC ah fie! . . . 
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But suicide is not the way out, for the ground of all woe 
is the insatiate will-to-live, self-asserting desire. This  de- 
sire the man who takes his own life does not deny o r  de- 
stroy. H e  is full of i t ;  precisely the vehemence with which 
he wills life and rebels against suffering brings him to  the 
point of destroying himself. “Just because the suicide can- 
not give up willing, he gives up living.” But here is no 
salvation, for suicide registers the victory, not the defeat, of 
the tyrant will ; the deliverance is altogether illusory, the 
will remains, only one of its individual manifestations has 
been destroyed. Deeper than individual life and death are 
the sources of woe in this world, and deeper and more rad- 
ical the path of salvation. No t  life is to be denied, but 
the will that is manifest in life, not the sufferings of exist- 
ence, which the slave of desire finds intolerable, but its 
illusory joys are to  be perceived and scorned and denied. 
In the midst of life, the desires of life and the will to  live 
are to be curbed. No t  death, cessation of life, but desire- 
less peace, cessation of craving, is the blessed goal. 
Here  intelligence may come to  our aid. Normally the 
intellect is a creature and tool of the will. In fact it is 
by virtue of his reason that man is the wicked animal: the 
brute’s snarl is the response to  an actual irritant, but man 
in revenge will harbor the evil resolve long after the orig- 
inal stirring of his wrath, will harbor i t  and with cold dis- 
dain will withstand the advances of tenderer emotions. So 
Mephistopheles speaks of man to  whom the spark of divine 
light has been vouchsafed: 
E r  hat Vernunft, doch braucht e r  sie allein 
Urn thierischer als jedes Thier  zu sein. 
Like a strong blind man, carrying on his shoulders the 
lame man who can see, even so are will and intellect. But 
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in exceptional instances the intellect may gain so clear and 
so profound an insight into the nature of things that it may 
gain temporary, habitual, permanent emancipation from the 
craving will. The  man who can see may check for a mo- 
ment the strong blind man’s headlong rush, may turn his 
course round about, may stop it altogether. 
T h e  first way out of the bondage of desire is in artistic 
contemplation. Raised by the power of the mind, a man 
may relinquish the common way of looking a t  things as 
related to  each other and to  his own will and advantage; 
he may so lose himself in the object as to  lose sight for  the 
moment of his own individuality and will; his mind as a 
clear mirror of the object may become one with it. “Then 
that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as 
such; but it is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate ob- 
jectivity of the will a t  this grade;  and, therefore, he who 
is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for  in such 
perception the individual has lost himself; but he is pure, 
will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge.” This  is 
desireless contemplation, the asthetic experience, the per- 
ception of the Platonic Ideas. Like the silent sunbeam that 
pierces through the rushing, aimless storm of craving pas- 
sion is the steady glance of genius; the desire and the pur- 
suit of particular things is like the rushing waterfall with 
its innumerable showering drops : the perception of a r t  is 
like the rainbow gently resting on this raging torrent. 
T h e  intellect thus perceives clearly the world of will, it- 
self being free for the moment f rom the miserable aims of 
self. T h e  lofty dome embodies before his eyes the conflict 
between gravity and rigidity, burden and support: this is the 
essence of architecture. T h e  beauty and grace of animal 
and human form is revealed in sculpture; in painting the 
rush and complexity of life is caught in a single moment of 
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time, and the spirit that has stifled self-will and passion 
breathes, calm and gentle, from the picture of the saint. 
Poetry reveals the essential life and character of man, in all 
his efforts and actions. I t  utters itself directly in the lyric; 
but the most profound insight of the poet discloses the un- 
speakable wail and woe of human life, its essential infelicity, 
the strife of will with itself, the triumph of evil, the scorn- 
f u l  mastery of chance. This is Tragedy, the summit of 
poetic art ,  and through the contemplation of it all the 
deeper insight is attained: not that there are evils in life, 
but that life is an evil. thing that had better not be. Tragedy 
thus prepares the way for that  curbing and quieting of the 
will-to-live which leads to  the ultimate release. 
But highest of all the arts is music, which expresses, not 
the manifestations of the Will, but the Will itself, its secret 
history and “all its emotions and strivings, with their mani- 
fold protractions, hindrances, and griefs.” T h e  disqui- 
etudes of the heart, its desires and aversions, and its various 
degrees of relief are uttered in the alternate play of dis- 
quieting chords that rouse longing, and the more or less 
quieting and satisfying chords. Thus the major and the 
minor keys unlock to us the two basic moods of the soul, 
serenity, or a t  least healthiness, and sadness, or even 
oppression. 
This is the liberating work of a r t :  when thus lifted out 
of the endless stream of willing, the mind observes things 
Li without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely 
objectively, gives itself entirely up to  them so f a r  as they 
are ideas, but not in so far as they are motives. Then  all a t  
once the peace which we were always seeking, but which 
always fled from us on the former path of the desires, comes 
to us of its own accord, and it is well with us. I t  is the 
painless state which Epicurus prized as the highest good 
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and as the state of the gods; we are for the moment set free 
f rom the miserable striving of the will; we keep the sab- 
bath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion 
stands still.” 
“So near 
us always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our 
misery; but who has the strength to  continue long in i t ?  
As soon as any single relation to  our will, t o  our person, 
even of these objects of our pure contemplation, comes 
again into consciousness, the magic is a t  an end. . . . 
I t  is not enough to  contemplate the inner nature of the will 
and woe: the momentary escape and relief from life is not 
enough; radical and permanent relief is needed. So a r t  is 
to  the man of insight, not a path out of life, but only an 
occasional consolation, “till his power, increased by this 
contemplation and a t  last tired of the play, lays hold on the 
real. T h e  St. Cecilia of Raphael may be regarded as a 
representation of this transition.” I t  is the transition from 
a r t  t o  morality and to  asceticism, from beauty to  virtue 
and to  holiness. 
Alas for  the impermanence of this salvation! 
9 7  
IV 
Schopenhauer found in Buddhism the religious version 
of his philosophy; and in no other respect is his reliance 
on Buddhism so thorough as in his moral gospel of de- 
liverance from self. T h e  self-centered life is illusory and 
wicked: ignorance and misery spring from the same source. 
T h e  Buddha, who preached peace through enlightenment, 
the saint who has banished the lure of self, has pricked the 
bubble of individuality; his life is a life of love because his 
mind has been emancipated from the illusions that breed 
selfishness. This  in brief is also Schopenhauer’s theory of 
morals. T h e  only real mark of acts truly moral is the 
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absence of selfish motive; such deeds are actuated by interest 
in one’s fellow beings, by pity for the suffering, sympathy 
with the cast down, justice and lovingkindness towards all. 
I f  the weal and woe of others affect my entire being so as to  
dominate my volition and motivate my deeds, then it is that  
compassion (Mitleid) enters, “the direct participation, in- 
dependent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings 
of another, leading to  sympathetic assistance in the effort 
to prevent or remove them”. T h e  compassionate man is 
just, he does not shift onto the shoulders of others the bur- 
dens which life brings to us all; but lovingkindness moves 
him rather to  relieve the heavy-laden and lighten their load. 
T h e  egoist, the malicious man, looks a t  all the world 
from the point of view of his own self-centered individual- 
ity. An impassable gulf separates him from his neighbor. 
But the compassionate man has more or less completely 
effaced the distinction between his own interests and those 
of others; beneath the multiplicity of this our world of 
shadow-shape existence he has perceived the more profound 
and ultimate reality. “No suffering is any longer strange 
to  him. . . . It is no longer the changing joy and sorrow 
of his own person that he has in view, as is the case with 
him who is still involved in egoism. . . . H e  knows the 
whole, comprehends its nature, and finds that it consists in 
a constant passing away, vain striving, inward conflict, and 
continual suffering. . . . W h y  should he now, with such 
knowledge of the. world, assert this very life through con- 
stant acts of will, and thereby bind himself ever more closely 
to it, press it ever more firmly to  himself? . . , T h e  will 
now turns away from life; it  now shudders a t  the pleasures 
in which it recognizes the assertion of life. Man  now at- 
tains to  the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, 
true indifference, and perfect will-lessness.” 
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To be just, noble, and benevolent is nothing else than 
to  translate my metaphysics into action.” This  is the an- 
cient wisdom of the Upanishads: Tat twam asi, This thou 
art, and compassion is really the practical expression of an 
insight which passes understanding : “Every purely benev- 
olent act, all help entirely and genuinely unselfish, being, 
as such, exclusively inspired by another’s distress, is, in fact, 
if we probe the matter to  the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece 
of mysticism put into practice ; inasmuch as it springs out 
of, and finds its only true explanation in, the same higher 
knowledge that constitutes the essence of whatever is 
mystical.” 
Most rare and astounding is compassionate conduct, and 
profound are the experiences that may occasion it. Arnold 
von Winkelried, t o  open a way for his comrades, clasps in 
his arms as many hostile spears as he can grasp and rushes 
forward to  his own death. Raymond Lully is admitted a t  
last to  the chamber of the fair lady he has long wooed, 
when she, opening her bodice, shows him her bosom fright- 
fully eaten with cancer. From that moment, as if he had 
looked into hell, the passionate man goes to  the desert to  
do  penance. Suffering itself has sanctifying power; pain is 
the lye that purifies life. One path to  salvation proceeds 
from perception and knowledge of the misery of life; a 
second path proceeds from great suffering itself. 
“ M y  whole philosophy,’’ young Schopenhauer wrote, in 
1817, “reduces itself to this: the self-knowledge of the 
Will.” T h e  keystone of all is resignation and denial of the 
will. Ethics and metaphysics are here one in a way radically 
different from Plato. T h e  denial of the will is the practical 
expression of the insight into the heart of reality which is 
ultimate philosophical wisdom. This  is wisdom: to  per- 
ceive the nothingness of value in the universe; for this is 
4 4  
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indeed the value of life, that it teaches us not to  wish for it. 
If we thus realize the metaphysical significance of com- 
passion, we see that it leads beyond itself to  something more 
thorough and final. Relieving the distress of life leads the 
moral saint t o  the resolve to  relieve and be relieved of 
the essential distress, life itself. Thus compassion leads to 
asceticism. Just as the sexual passion is the supreme 
affirmation of the will to  live, so voluntary chastity is its 
supreme renunciation. T h e  man in the grip of sexual pas- 
sion imagines that he is seeking his own highest fulfilment 
and gratification, and all the while he is but a tool of the 
will, fulfilling its end, the perpetuation of the species, 
the continuance of the wretched tragicomedy of life. T h e  
ascetic has perceived the wretchedness of the tragi-comedy : 
he will not p lay  any more, the will itself he has curbed with- 
in him, and its empire over him is a t  an end. 
T o  such a profound insight into life, and to  such heroic 
resolve, individual life or death are as indifferent as is life 
in general. Death is but the final payment of that debt 
which was contracted a t  conception and birth; and to  each 
man death is the great reprimand: you have ever sought 
your own pleasure and advantage, but see, you are nothing 
lasting, you are nothing. From all the lusts of life the 
ascetic is free, a conteinptus mundi, a supreme blessed in- 
difference exalts him. “Everything is alike to  me,” Madame 
Guion writes, “I cannot will anything more: often I know 
not whether I exist o r  not.” A sublime melancholy is the 
ascetic’s, which is also a joy ineffable, fa r  more profound 
than any condition of desire. T h e  man who has divorced 
life itself and espoused chastity, scorns his own meat and 
drink. H i s  appetites are all renounced and death to  him 
brings no reprimand: he does not struggle to  avert it, nor 
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does he violently seek it : voluntary starvation seals the 
denial which his every thought and act have signalized. 
Before us is the thoroughgoing denial of all that is: 
“that constant strain and effort without end and without 
rest a t  all the grades of objectivity, in which and through 
which the world consists ; the multifarious forms succeeding 
each other in gradation; the whole manifestation of the 
will; and, finally, also the universal forms of this manifesta- 
tion, time and space, and also its last fundamental form, 
subject and object; all are abolished. No will: no idea, 
no world.” 
Schopenhauer’s answer is famous: “Tha t  we abhor anni- 
hilation so greatly, is simply another expression of the 
fact that we so strenuously will life, and are nothing but 
this will, and know nothing beside it. . . . W h a t  remains 
after the entire abolition of the will is for all those who 
are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, t o  
those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, 
this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky- 
ways-is nothing.” 
V 
“If we admit that all is will, that all will is effort, that 
effort attains its aim only in exceptional cases, and that all 
frustrated effort is pain, that life, that is t o  say pain, does 
not end with death; it follows that there is only one possible 
remedy, to  suppress pain by suppressing life, by suppressing 
the will. And as the body is the will made visible, t o  deny 
the body through asceticism is t o  deny the will. Just as 
procreation perpetuates life and woe, so the suppression 
of it in chastity is a suppression of the species. Conse- 
quently the ideal which Schopenhauer proposed to  mankind 
is a suicide en mmxe by metaphysical means. In logic,” 
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Ribot concludes his summary, “all this is very well. In 
reality it is another matter.” I t  is the logic of the theory 
which we should first diagnose, for its well-being is on the 
surface. Our  first question may be stated bluntly: how 
can the will deny itself? O r  it can be expressed more sys- 
tematically, with reference to  Schopenhauer’s philosophy : 
in a system of thorough-going pessimism what room is there 
for a doctrine of salvation? O r  yet conversely: is a world 
which admits of salvation, even though it be through utter 
resignation, a world of wholly negative value ? 
Already in the forties Schopenhauer’s earliest followers, 
-Becker, Frauenstadt-were worrying over the difficulty 
of reconciling the denial of the will with the universal neces- 
sity of motivation. If character is unchangeable, how is 
the conversion to  saintliness possibl’e? If all that takes 
place is determined ultimately by the will to  live, then how 
can negation of the will take place? If the will-to-live is 
universally dominant, how is the ascetic’s choice of volun- 
tary chastity to  be explained? If the intellect is but the 
tool of the will, like claw or beak or venom, how can the 
saint, a t  the apex of intelligence, deny the will altogether? 
Should we not perhaps postulate, in opposition to the self- 
assertive will and its subservient intellect, a higher will- 
denying intelligence and also a higher Wil l?  Schopenhauer 
does not minimize the difficulty, but he does not meet it. 
H e  relies here on Kant’s doctrine of the empirical and the 
intelligible character : the former is, of course, always neces- 
sarily determined, Schopenhauer would say, by the self- 
assertive will-to-live. “But the entire will-act, which is the 
intelligible character, as it in itself and atemporally wills, 
may just as well not will,-instead of a Yelle ,  it may just 
as well be a Nolle.” But is there no gradual attainment of 
saintly insight, a gradual approach to  complete negation of 
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the will? Schopenhauer replies : This growing insight pre- 
pares, but does not bring about gradually the will-denial. 
Only when intelligence has reached its apex of exaltation, 
its boiling point, does this entirely new phenomenon, the 
denial of the will, take place. A wanderer pursues his 
course, lantern in hand. Suddenly he sees that he is a t  
the brink of an abyss, and turns about. T h e  wanderer is the 
will, the lantern is the intellect. T h e  wanderer does not 
turn a little to  the right or to  the left ;  he turns completely 
about, he abandons his former course altogether. T h e  con- 
version is radical, and it is sudden, not gradual. T h e  em- 
pirical, will-determined character has not been mended, but 
ended and given up altogether. There  is mystery in this 
deliverance from the will : repeatedly Schopenhauer quotes 
the words of Malebranche: “Liberty is a mystery.” T h e  
peace of God passeth all understanding. This re-creation 
of man is what the Church calls a work of grace: we must 
be born anew. T h e  natural man, the assertion of the will- 
to-live, is symbolized in Adam, but grace, the denial of the 
will, salvation, is in Christ, who is God incarnate. “Cer- 
tainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) 
and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which 
constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what 
remains is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories.” 
Jesus Christ is thus to  Schopenhauer the symbol or person- 
ification of the negation of the will-to-live. 
But the Christian mystery is not to  be compared to  Scho- 
penhauer’s. ?‘he enigma of evil in Christianity concerns 
creation, finite existence: in a universe grounded in Perfect 
Goodness how can evil be permanent, and why should it be 
a t  a l l?  Dismal as is its view of the phenomenal world 
(original sin), Christianity is essentially and ultimately 
optimistic. Perfect in wisdom and goodness and power is 
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its ultimate reality, God, perfect and prevailing. But Scho- 
penhauer’s mystery is a mystery of good; we have heard 
of nothing but thorns and thistles in his philosophical gar- 
den, and, behold, grapes and figs are on his branches1 
Surely the trees, the roots of reality, have not been ade- 
quately perceived and described. Deeper and more ultimate 
than Schopenhauer’s pessimism is his doctrine of salvation, 
deeper and more ultimate, and fa r  more enlightening. T h e  
metaphysical significance of compassion and asceticism is 
more profound than Schopenhauer allowed : it  reveals t o  
us the more ultimate nature of the will-reality. “So then, 
behind the raw, unmoral will,” we read in Volkelt, “a 
deeper will-kernel is hid: the morally significant will. . . . 
Now . . . we can perceive this will-to-live, which was pro- 
claimed as the deepest reality, that it is a shell, behind 
which lurks the Will as a morally momentous power.” 
W e  are now on the way to  perceive new meaning in the 
very contradictions of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. T h e  con- 
fusion in Schopenhauer’s use of intelligence and will has 
been pointed out often enough. T h e  will is blind, blunder- 
ing, aimless, irrational, but it has manifested itself in and 
has for its tool purposive intelligence. But we should not 
be misled into mistaking confusion for final contradiction. 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is in many ways a drama of 
reality. Confused and discordant appear its characters a t  
the outset; more and more fully are they revealed to  us 
as we move to  the climax. T h e  four parts of Schopen- 
hauer’s W o r l d  as W i l l  and Idea are four acts of a drama- 
their order and sequence are not accidental and indifferent, 
nor are we moving on a plane. There  is increasing depth and 
height, penetration and exaltation of insight as we proceed. 
N o t  only the audience or readers, the dramatist himself 
may learn about his characters, and it is poor criticism 
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to  abuse an author because his characters go their own 
way and do  not follow his own projected course for  them. 
Tolstoy’s men and women do  not always conform to  his text 
and sermons; they have characters of their own, and Anna 
Karenina is not the less great as a novel because Tolstoy 
finds Levin too real t o  manage. Enough if both author and 
reader, both dramatist and audience have been led to  per- 
ceive new abysses in the human soul and in reality. All the 
greater is the novel or the drama because it has thus deep- 
ened our insight. Abstract consistency is not the sovereign 
virtue either in literature or in philosophy. Point out the 
discrepancy, the shift of viewpoints in the successive stages 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, t o  be sure ; but it were mere 
pedantry to  rest satisfied with such criticism. 
Consider the world of experience : is it not a phenomenal 
system of events in space and time, causally related and 
always involved in the subject-object dualism? But look 
more deeply: behind the phenomenal scheme, back of this 
Maya veil of experience is the blind, blundering, aimless 
Wil l ;  the rational shell holds an irrational kernel; intelli- 
gence is a t  the beck of desire; the will-driven soul is a slave 
of insatiate craving, miserable and wicked. This  pessimistic 
metaphysics is not merely a substitute for  the preceding 
idealistic theory of knowledge, not merely inconsistent with 
i t :  we witness here a grim expansion of thought, the dark 
recognition of the limitations of the phenomenal, the sense 
of unsounded, dismal depths, and profound despair. W e  
are  plunged in what seems impenetrable, whirling chaos that  
sweeps us resistlessly about and there seems no way out of 
the whirlpool and no beacon-light ahead. But a beacon- 
light does appear, and a way out, not t o  firm ground that  
eye can see o r  hand or foot can touch, but surely out of 
the whirlpool of will-driven desire. There is momentary 
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respite in art ,  there is the lasting quietism of compassion 
and chastity and Nirvana. For one to  whom the whirlpool 
had been all-in-all, the out-of-it, to  be sure, is bodiless, with- 
out content, nothing. When Schopenhauer says “we freely 
acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition 
of the will is for all those who are still full of will certainly 
nothing,” he is unconsciously criticising the finality of his 
own pessimism. For,  these are the last words of T h e  W o r l d  
as W i l l  and Idea, “conversely, to those in whom the will has 
turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, 
with all its suns and stars and milky-ways-is nothing.’’ And 
nothing, narrow and inadequate, is likewise the view of 
things as essentially and hopelessly will-driven and irra- 
tional. No t  only the will is a t  peace in the sublime moment 
of Esthetic contemplation, not only the will is curbed and 
negated by the moral saint: the pessimism of Schopen,hauer 
is also thereby curbed and negated. T h e  world is not so 
worthless if it includes souls that are pessimistic about it, 
that condemn it, and that seek and find a way out, be this 
way the way to  apparent nothingness. Condemnation is 
not only the reverse of esteem: it is also its obverse. Even 
on Schopenhauer’s premises a world which includes a 
Buddha, a Theologia Germanica, a Schopenhauer is not a 
world that warrants absolute pessimism. Thus  Schopen- 
hauer’s Esthetics and ethics, running counter as they do  to  
his pessimism, may teach us what they have not taught him: 
wisdom more final than his pessimism. They  serve to  indi- 
cate the limits of his pessimism, and therefore demand 
its radical revision. 
T h e  world whose nature has been disclosed to  us in the 
whole of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is certainly not a 
world which warrants docile, complacent optimism. I t  de- 
mands a heroic, perhaps a Zoroastrian view. But absolute, 
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hopeless gloom it does not demand nor warrant. Like 
Gautama, Schopenhauer had eyes to  see darkness and a 
genius for gloom, but, like Gautama again, he sensed within 
himself enlightenment and the clear path of salvation. No 
philosopher has been more personal than Schopenhauer, 
according to  Paulsen ; none since Pascal, according to  Ruys- 
sen. Out of the roots of his heart’s agonies have sprung 
the ashen shoots of his pessimism. But Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy is not objectively personal: it does not take due 
account of itself. T h e  man who condemned the world 
confronted it disdainfully, but not disdaining himself ; he 
who preached the vanity and tedium of attainment never 
doubting the lasting value of his own work. I n  all this he 
was inconsistent : had his judgment of the world explicitly 
included himself, Goethe, Plato, Kant, Beethoven, Rossini, 
Buddha, Arnold von Winkelried, AbbC Ranci, Madame 
Guion, it would have been different in its finality. Is the 
laurel crown a crown of thorns covered with leaves? Small 
reason for despair here, if man will have laurel crowns a t  
any cost. T h e  sun rises and shines on an earth in which 
there is as yet no life: “I am the sun and must rise because 
I am the sun : look on me who can !” Beautiful, green, and 
blooming is the oasis, and it bewails its lonely charms, spent 
as they are on the desert-waste. But the desert answers: 
“Were I no waste, thou wert no oasis!” H e r e  are echoes 
from the agonies of Schopenhauer’s own spirit, but they are 
not agonies of pure, absolute despair. T h e  note of heroic 
worth is in them all. 
T h e  recognition of the personal element in Schopen- 
hauer’s view of fife nowise justifies a treatment of his philos- 
ophy as a pathological phenomenon. Wi th  romantic inten- 
sity Schopenhauer perceived the tragic side of life, his own 
life affording him no lack of material. H e  could make no 
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reasoned sense of the tragedy, and his irrationalism is more 
rightly to  be regarded as a conclusion from its pessimism 
rather than as its premise. Keenly conscious of supreme 
worth, philosophic, asthetic, moral-mystical, he yet saw it 
as wholly alien in this vale of woe, and demanding for  its 
full utterance the renunciation of the world. Hence his 
nihilistic gospel of salvation. T h e  paradox and the incon- 
sistency in Schopenhauer are fundamentally religious. Not  
without reason did Tolstoy call Schopenhauer “the most 
gifted of men”, and as late as 1890 retained Schopenhauer’s 
picture and no other in his room. Not  without reason 
did Schopenhauer look to  the opposite bank of the Main, 
to  the house where five hundred years earlier a Frankfurter 
had written the Theologia Gernzalzica. For  is not this the 
Christian truth also, only outwardly inconsistent and para- 
doxical: man is a sinner tainted and wholly bad, yet he is 
also the son of God. “ H e  is not in reality what he is as a 
matter of fact.” H i s  mind is a tool of the tyrant will, he 
is greed, lust, egoism, cruelty personified; but see, his is 
also disinterested, esthetic contemplation, his is the pure 
intelligence that sees through the will, that curbs and de- 
nies the will, his the compassion, the chastity, the blessed- 
ness, the peace of the saint. 
This  paradox and mystery raise a still more ultimate 
one, which Schopenhauer recognizes, but renounces as 
wholly beyond his ken. Why this paradox and mystery? 
Whence is the great discord that permeates this world? 
If the roots of individuality go as deep as the assertion of 
the will t o  live, and are thus extirpated in the act of will- 
denial, then what would I be if I were not the will-to-live? 
Whence finally this will that may either assert itself, or be 
denied altogether ? These are questions to  which no answer 
may be given. Our minds are unsuited to  deal with them. 
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“With our intellect, this mere tool of the will, we are  
everywhere striking upon insoluble problems, as against 
the walls of our prison.’’ A knowledge of the very inmost 
being-in-itself of things, is thus unavailable, for  it transcends 
the forms of knowledge and consciousness: “so much as to  
the limits of my philosophy, and indeed of all philosophy.” 
“Whatever torch we may kindle, and whatever space it 
may light, our horizon will always remain bounded by pro- 
found night.” And a t  the conclusion of his lectures Scho- 
penhauer quotes Lucretius : 
I n  what a gloom of life, in what dire perils 
Are spent our years, however few they be! 
T h e  brighter the philosophical light that illumines the dark- 
ness of existence, the greater will the all-surrounding dark- 
ness disclose itself t o  be, and “the more intelligent a man 
is, the more keenly aware is he what darkness surrounds 
him, and just this stimulates him philosophically.” Why this 
world has so much evil that  thwarts and resists the good, 
why it is thus and not otherwise : is this no problem of ours? 
Goethe wrote in the album of a student, and Schopenhauer 
quoted to  Adam von Doss: “The  good God has indeed 
created the nut, but he has not also cracked it.” And 
well it is so. 
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